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RISK MANAGEMENT THEORY: REDUCING
LIABILITY IN CORPORATE AND MEDICAL
ENVIRONMENTS
Edward P. Richards*
Abraham Silvers**
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a consensus in the business community that the
traditional methods of resolving legal disputes have become too
time consuming and expensive.1 This has led businesses to explore
v a rious a lternative strategies for dispute resolution,• and to be
come increasingly interested in dispute avoidance strategies such
as risk management. 8 This article presents an analytic framework
for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of risk management strate
gies.• The problem of cost-effectiveness is critical to the develop
ment of risk management programs because many risks may be
* Of counsel, Roberts & Markel, Houston, Texas. B.A., Rice University; J.D., Univer
sity of Houston. Member of Texas bar.
** Assoc iate Professor, Baylor College of Medicine; Associate ProfeSBOr, University of
Texas School of Pu bl ic Health. B.S., University of California, Los Angeles; Ph.D., University
of California, Los Angeles.
1.

The Highest Legal Fees,

NawswBBK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 71; Fat Fees, Tum, July 27,
R. Banks Litigation Coat Control: A Xerox Case History, CBNTBR POR Pua.
RESOURCES NEws LETTBR, VI, Bl (1980) to be reprinted in 1 DrsPUTB MANAGEMENT: A M AN
.
UAL OF INNOVATIVE CORPORATl!l STRATBGIBS FOR T H E AVOIDANCE AND RuoLUTION OP DISPUTES,
1981, at 68;

,



VI:Bl (1982 ).
2. Bodily, When Should You Go To Court?, HARV. B us. REV., May-June 1981, at 103;
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST . L.J. _, _ (1982). See alao Working
Smarter, FORTUNE, June 15, 1981, at 68.

3. Risk manag ement is c onaidered a subset of the general area of preventative law,
although it is almost
impossible to define a preventative law strategy that is not also a risk
man age ment strategy. This area was pioneered by Louis Brown, who has written extensively
on the problem of
s
preventative law. See L. BROWN, PREVENTATIVE LAW (1950); L. BROWN &
E. DAU ER, PLA NNING BY LAWYBRS: MATERIALS ON A NON-ADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROC BSS (1978);
Brown, Preven
tatiue Law and Public Relations-Improving the Legal Health of America,
39 A.B.A.J. 556
(1953); BRO WN, AN INQUIRY INTO WHETHER PREVENTATIVE LAw SHOULD BE
RANKED AS A SPECIALITY

(ABA Specialization Monograph No. 2).
in terms of a statistical model, it is meant to be a
heuristic device rather than an algorithm that can be used for calculations. Someone wishing
4.

While this framework is expressed

to use this model for computations would have to collect substantial background data to

make the model useful in a specific situation. Refer to text acc ompanying notes 9-10 supra.
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excess of the cost of their occur
prevented only at a cost greatly in
.
ent these risks woul d go bankrenc e.11 A business that tried to prev
essful
r upt, even if its intervention s were succ
:
.
g with the complex
This article also presents a model for dealm
from the presence of
interactions between risk factors that arise
pipelining are central
feedback6 and pipelining.7 Feedback and
long interval between
problems in risk management because of the
tion of the resulting
the occurrence of a risk and the eventual resolu
more persons to
judicial proceedings. This delay may allow many
ess becomes aware
be injure d (filling the pipeline) before the busin
development of
of the risk. Pipelining can only be avoided by the
tly used in
more effective monitoring parameters than those curren

the business environment. 8
The model for dealing with these problems p r esents a basic set
to
of tools to help legal planners and risk manage ment personnel
develop strategies to more effectively monitor the performance of
risk management programs. The preliminary design criteria are re

viewed for establishing a risk monitoring program in a hospital,
using examples that are applicable to other businesses. These cri
teria are necessarily rudimentary because we lack accurate data on
risk management problems. A major goal of this article is to pre
sent a common framework for risk management data collection
and evaluation.9 This will allow the collection of data from many
5.

The problem of cost effectiveness became critical in the medical environment when

many hospitals had their malpractice insurance premiums raised 50 ':'.� or more. For facilities

without a history of large losses it was n o longer cost effective to continue their existing
insurance arrangements. See B. BROWN, RISK MANAGEMENT FoR HosPITALS 5 (1979); Kors ak,

Risk Management Activities Boost Effectiveness of Self-Insurance P rogram, 52 HosP., Feb.
16, 1978, at

Ribin

&

58;

Larson, Malpractice Self Insurance, 31 J. HosP. MGMT., Aug. 1977, at

MGMT., Aug. 1979, at
6.

42;

Staples, Risk Management Is More Than Buying Insurance Policies, 32 J. HosP.

20.

.
m th � process, eith�r reducing the probability of the end result (negative feedback), or in
.
creasing the probab1hty
of the end result (positive feedback).
7. Pipelining is a term borrowed from the oil business. In that context it originally
.
.
meant the amount of 01! that had to be put mto
an empty pipeline before any oil came out
.
the ?ther end. This represented the amount of oil that would remain in the pipeline after
the mput was stopped. In general, pipelining represents any process that
cont'mues for a
.
·
·
·
1s stopped.
mput
af ter its
pen·00 of time
Feedback occurs when the end result of a continuing process influences earlier steps

8. An example of this was the industry-wide rating system f or
ma J pract'ice insuranc
·
e
. .
.
.
premium s that prevented md1v1dual hospitals from benefiting from
th e1r
· exemp Iary c 1aims
·
.
records. See Qm_nley, Self·I�urance, 31 J. HosP. MGMT., Nov. 1977,
at 20.
9. The desue to quantify legal analysis is as old as J·urispr
ud ence 1·tse If , but the most
.
.
succmct statement of the problem was by Judge Cardozo··
"They do th mgs better with
·
logar1t
· hms. " B . cARDOZO, THE pARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 1 (1928)
· s ee a l so vanyo,
The Le·
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different sources and the integration of this data into a general
model of risk management intervention.10
II.

THE

ECONOMICS OF

RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management efforts must save more money than they
cost if they are to be acceptable to business. It does not make eco
nomic sense to spend $100 to prevent a risk whose occurrence will
cost only ten dollars. 11 While it may be socially desirable to pre
vent injuries to workers, a corporation would cheat its shareholders
if it spent more to prevent injuries than it saved through those
expenditures.12 In most situations it is cost-effective to prevent in
juries, but this decision must be based on economic data, not on
appeals to corporate paternalism. The old corporate controls based
on government regulation have proven unacceptable, but corpora
tions have begun to realize that the �tive of regulation
through Jitigation can be much more cos#. than government regu
lation.18 Thia new litigati on
te de'8Dda that corporations
quic kly develop mechanisma to manage dab, lelt they face cata
stro phic losses from unanticipated litiga.n.
There are three contributiona to the • of rilk takina behav
ior. The first is the direct cost due to the OCCJUftlc
l e of the risk.
This includes the 1088 of skilled pe rsonn el, machine downtime, and
other factors that reduce productivity, as well as the payment of
com pens ation to the injured party. The second is the cost of the
efforts to prevent or manage the risk before its occurrence. The
·

gal Syste m Can it Be Analyzed to Suit the Scientist?, in ScmHTlSTS IN THK l..sGAL YSTKM
(W. Thomas ed. 1974).
10. For a discussion of the importance of model building, see R. Po uND, SOCIAL CON·
TROL THROUGH LAW (1942). As Profe880r Pound stated: "Theories of what i1 have a marked
effect upon i deas of what ought to be. Men tend to do what they think they are doing." Id.
at 26. Another commentator has noted that "[t]he function of a general theory of law i1 not
to discover the immediate sources of law, however important that may be in the atudy of a

particu lar area, b u t to segregate the factors which operate in all areas in the creation, modi·
fic atio n, transformation and disappearance of legal a)'ltema." H. C ADlNS, Tm Tu.BORY or

LEGAL SClENCE 89 (1969).

11. For an analysis of the economic basis of tort law and ita impact on risk taking, aee
tev ens, M edical Malpractice: Some /mplicatiom of Contract and Arbitration in HM0'1,
59 Mil.BANK MEMO AL FuND Q./HBALTH AND Socirrv, 59, 66 (1981). See allo C. TONK,
RI
WH.ERB Tm LAw ENDS, Tus Socw. CoNTROL or CoRPORATS BKH Avtoa 33 (1975).

This is certainly true if the expenditures cauaed the corporation to 10 out of buai
For a discussion of the merita of this view in leaa draatic circU1D.1tancee, aee C. STONE,
supra note 11,
at 75.
13. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prada. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S
. 869 (1974).
n

12.

·
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third is the cost of the new risks that arise from the efforts to con
trol the existing risks.14 The complications that arise from medical
laboratory tests that are ordered because of a fear of malpractice
suits are a good example of these newly created risks. It would be
very difficult to defend a patient injury from a medically unneces
sary test. The cost of these new risks can be important during the
initial p hase of a new risk management program when their cost is
added to the cost of the claims incurred before the start of the new
program w hose effects are still being felt. After these initial costs
are absorbed, the costs of the risk managemen t activities will be
offset by the decreased losses due to the reduced incidence of ex
isting risks. There will come a point of diminishing returns how
ever, where the costs of the risk management program will no
longer be offset by the savings from the reduced incidence of ex
isting risks.
al
··

·

·

ematic
To put the problem of diminishing returns into a math
. .
actl 
ment
ge
mana
risk
of
cost
total
the
shorthand let C represent
et n
ties; let
repr:sent the costs due to the occurrence of risk; l
Cm rep�esen
represent the direct cost of risk management efforts; let
re atl
the indirect cost of risk management activities due to the �
n
risks.
new risks·' and let L represent the total losses related to
the occurthe total losses will equal the sum of the costs re1ated t0
.
the nsks.
nt
ve
_pre
to
efforts
the
l
_
a
of
�9��
e_t9!
s
�n<:i.th
o(_!lsk
rence

�

C�

�
�:
.

___

__

L ""'C0 +CR

The total cost of the efforts to prevent the risks will equal the
money directly spent on risk management efforts , plus the costs
due to the new risks that are crea
ted:

CR =CD+ CID

�hen there are no expenditures for risk management efforts, t�ere

s·
will also not be any indirect losses
due to the creation of new rISk
At this point the cost of the
occurrence of risks will be the total
ef
losses of the program. If it is
assumed that risk management
forts will ave some effect on
reducing the costs due to the �ur·
ks
rence of risks, then the costs
of the occurrence of existing ri�
should he at their maximum
value when the expenditures for rISk
management activities are
zero.
When the business begins to spend money on risk m anage·

�

14. For a discussion of the cost.a
nalifll
aaaociated with the use of extra x-rays, see Ma
Severe Head Injury, Doing More and
Fari111 Worse?, 1980 LANCBT 1229.
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ment activities, the costs due to the occurrence of risks will de
crease. This reduction will continue until all the preventable risks
are eliminated, leaving only an irreducible baseline cost due to the
occurrence of unpreventable risks. Because it is impossible to pre
vent all risks, 111 the costs due to the occurrence of risks can only be
reduced t o this baseline level. At the same time that the increased
expenditures for risk management efforts are reducing the costs
due to the occurrence of risks, the costs due to the occurrence of
new risks created by the risk management efforts will be increas
ing. Since the total cost of the risk management program includes
both the direct expenditures for risk management activities and
the indirect costs arising from the creation of new risks, then the
total cost of the risk management program· will always be greater
than the b udgeted expenditures.
These r elatio nships imply that the costs resulting from the oc
currence of risks are inversely related1• to the total cost of the risk
management efforts. This inverse relationship holds to the point
where the costs due to the occurrence of risks have been reduced
to their minimum level. Once this minimum level has been
reached, further expenditures for risk management activities will
not r educe the costs due to the occurrence of risks. H the total
costs of risk management
activities (Ca) are plotted against the
costs due to the
occurence of risks (C0), with (K) representing the
minimum cost of
existing risks, then a graph of the following type
.
will b e o b tained:

K

�11

15. Ju e
have
dg Bazelon once stated that "[t]be question is then not whether w�
. k
ris
at all, but
205
y,
Re1ponaibilit
and
Risk
Bazelon,
how much risk and
from what source."
.

ScrENcE 277 (1979).

.
16· An inverse relationship means that one quantity decreases
�uantity
increas
es. This may
i n nak man·
be a direct relationahip such • when a one-dollar
.
&ge rnent
expenditures results in a one.:dollar drop in the coats due to neb, or it may be
lllo re co m
plex inv olvin the quantification of nonmonetary benefits.
g

•':'8n ano�er
m�

(Vol. 19:251
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It is only the basic type of the curve that is important.17 It is im
possible to establish a value for any of the points along the curve
without actual data on the costs and benefits of the particular risk
management system under study.
Since the total losses related to risks are equal to the sum of
the costs due to the occurrence of risks (both new and old) and the
cost of the risk management activities, the curve illustrates that
there will be a point where it is not cost effective to spend more
money on risk management activities. Once this point is reached,
the added expenditures will not result in a corresponding decrease
in the losses due to the occurrence of risks. This is the optimal
operating point for a risk management program, and can only be
r ecognized by careful analysis of the decrease in the costs due to
the occurrence of risks for each increase in direct risk management
expenditures. By using this operating point as a reference, it is
possible to set up five risk classes, based on the economic conse
quences of the occurrence of specific individual risks:
1.

Prevented risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence is higher
than their cost of management, and whose occurrence may
invoke additional legal sanctions. This class would include
intentional torts and injuries caused by gross negligence.18

2.

Normally prevented risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence
is greater than the cost of their management, but whose
occurrence will only b e considered negligent. This class in
cludes most negligent injuries and most type of products
liability actions. 19

17. The important characteristics of this curve are that it intercepts the Y axis {where
the c�sts due to the occurrence of risks have a highest value) and it reaches a limit (the
baseline cost of unpreventable risks) despite further increases in the expenditwes for risk
management activities.
A
18. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. pp. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967), where the court noted the fo llo w ing:
From all ?f the evidence �he jury could find that appellant acted recklessly and in
w�ton �isregard of possible harm to others in marketing, promoting, selling and
. mg MER/29
mamtam
on the market in view of its knowledge of the toxic effects of
.
the ?rug. Sue? a findmg
would necessarily be a finding of malice in fact, and since
�he Jury was instructed only on malice as a foundati
on for an award of punitive
am8!es and �ade such an award in respondent's
favor, we must presume that
_ fact.
they •Ound malice m
Id. at 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
19. For example, it is generally recogniz
· ed that a swgeon s failure to remove a sponge
. .
before closing the �:�is
. ��gl'igence as a matter of law. See, e.g., Thom
t.;n 18
pson v. Barnard,
A
142 S.W 2d 238
ex. iv.
pp.-Waco 1940), aff'd 138 Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d
.
486
•

•

·
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Managed risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence is only
slightly greater than their cost of management. The plain
tiff usually has the burden of showing that the defendant

owed him or her a special duty to recover for one of these
risks.20

4.

Unprevented risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence is less

than their cost of management. The classic example of this
class ·is the cost of railroad crossing barriers compared to
the damages sustained by people who are hit by trains.11

5.

Unpreventable
manageable. 22

Risks.

Risks

whose

occurrence is un

The assignment of a risk to one of these classes is a major
problem in risk managemen t because the class of a risk determines
how much effort must be expended to prevent the risk. The mis
classification of a prevented or normally prevented risk as a man
age d or unprevented risk can result in large financial losses. For
ex�m ple, a hospital that
does not update obsolete procedures such
as •�accurate monitoring of oxygen in the premature nursery would
he hable for any injuries attributable to this failure to update pro
cedures. 23 These classifications must be reviewed periodically to
de�ermine if the
cost of the risk taking behavior has changed, al
tering the classification
of the risks.

III.

CALCULATING

THE

COST OF RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR

Ther e are two parties to risk taking, the party with the re
sp on sib ility
for managing or preventing the risk (the riskor), and
the p art y
who is injured by the occurrence of the risk (the riskee).
094 2).
20· See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OP THE LAW or TORTS 244-45 (4th ed. 197l).
.
d . 21. Ther e are
have warm�g
thousands o f railroad/highway intersections that do not
1 es. to sign al the app roach f an o ncoming train. These unguarded intersectio� result m
o
a
· · tam num
on to the
railroad to pay out compensati
ber of

::;

accidents each year fo rcing the
wer than the
Parties in ma
ny cases. yet the total cost of these payments is much lo
st of prov
.
W. PROSSER,
See
ccidents
i
ding the signaling devices that would prevent these a
��
pra note
20, at 148.
.
.
22 These ri
ord1s ks incl ude acts o f God, acts of war, and force majeur e. he riskor I�
.
na ·1
r
not lia le
uted
b for da mages for the occ urrence of these risks unless the r1skor contr ib
to 1 Y
d h e dam ag e
rth
uake
ea
r
q
ope
p
caused by the risk through neg ligence, such as not using r
es gn
criteria. See,
1
e.g., J. MURRAY, CoNTRAcrs 390-91 (1974).
.
2
.-Waco 1979, wnt
ir Shields, Inc. v S
. pears, 590 S.W.2 d 574, 581 (Tex. Civ. App
rerd 3· A
n.r .e.).
lhJUred

1:

�
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When a risk occurs, the riskor suffers certain direct costs. The ris
kor will spend a certain amount to determine whether, and how
much, the riskee should be paid in compensation for the injury,
and will then pay the riskee the determined amount. The total cost
to the riskor will be the sum of the cost of the reduced productiv
ity, the cost of evaluating the claim for compensation, and the ac
tual compensation payment. These costs are independent of the
amount that the riskor may have spent on risk management ef
forts, except to the extent that the risk management efforts miti
gated the damage caused by the occurrence of the risk. This inde
pendence derives from the legal practice of determining the
damages due an injured person without reference to the status of
the party responsible for the injury.•' This means that while risk
management efforts may show good faith on the part of the riskor,
they will only reduce the cost of a risk by the actual amount that
the damages are mitigated; there is no allowance for unsuccessful
efforts. These costs become interrelated in the situations where the
courts consider the behavior or status of the riskor:

(1) When there is a statutory penalty involved. The criminal

penalties for misprescribing narcotics are an important example;••

(2) When the injury resulted from an intentional or grossly

negligent act. When this occurs, the court allows the award of pu·
nitive damages;..

(3) When the law limits the compensation that may be paid

in order to protect the riskor from financial loss. This is the effect
of the workers' compensation laws, and the specific purpose of
many statutes limiting the recovery of damages in medical mal·
practice suits;97 and
(4) When a comparative negligence standard is used. While
comparative negligence is seldom used in the trial of a medical
malpractice suit, negligence on the part of the patient (not re·
turning for follow-up care, for example) can weaken the proof of
causation and drastically lower the settlement value of the case.11
In each of these situations there has been a public policy deci24·

BALDWIN, Damages in Personal Injury
and Death Cases' in

(state Bar of Texas 1977).
25·D
8!1gerous

DAMAGES E-1

to 19

Drugs Act, TEX. RBv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 44766
14 (Vernon 197).
Reier to note 18 supra.
27. Medical Liability and Insur
ance ImProvem ent Act, 'I'Ex. RBv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4590i (Vernon Supp. 1982).
26

·

28.

See generally W. PRossER, supr
a note 20, at 416.
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sion that the cost to society should be considered when damages
are assessed against the riskor. This is because the relationship be
tween the cost of the occurrence of a risk and the cost of managing
the risk determ i nes how vigorously the corporation will attempt to
manage the risk. 29 Society can only effectuate its policies by alter
i ng the relationship between the cost of the occurrence of a risk
and the cost of managing the risk.ao The riskor will best balance its
needs against those of the individual workers, and of society as a
whole, when the worker receives enough to be made whole, and the
cost of the occurrence of the risk is greater than the cost of
preventing the risk. In general, there are four types of situations:
when the compensation payment does not make the original riskee
whole, then the riskee may be unwilling to be exposed to the risk;
when the compensation payment is more than the amount needed
to m ake the riskee whole, then the riskee may contribute to the
occurrence of the risk; when the cost of the occurrence is less than
the cost of managing the risk, then the original riskor will not have
an ince ntive to prevent the risk;81 and when the cost of the occur
rence is mu ch higher than the cost of managing the risk, the riskor
may totally prevent the risk by not engaging in the business that
causes the risk, at the expense of the benefits to society that are
normally gained from this business.11
When the cost of managing a risk greatly exceeds the cost of
the occu rrence of the risk, the riskor may allow the occurrence of
risks whose cost to society is unacceptably high.u Since existing
29. For a mathematical analysis of the optimal level of malpractice litigation, see
Schwartz & Komesar,
Doctors, Damages, and Deterrence, 298 N•w ENG. J. MED. 1282

(l978)

care) .

(concluding that there are too few suits to provide

an incentive to improve medical

30.

But see C. STONE, supra note 11, at 91.
For exa mple , in the criminal proceeding against Richardson-M enell for lying to
the Food and
Drug Ad minist ration about the hazards of MER/29, the company pleaded no
conte st, and was
fined only $80,000. Id. at 56.
.
. 32. While many insurance companies have maintained that the coet of � roducts Iiabil1ty msur ance
has driven many products off the market, it is difficult to pinpoint an example
of a ben efici
al product that is unavailable because of insurance coeta.
31.

33.

In this regard, Stone offers the following eumple:
April 1960 the FDA granted Richardson-Merrell's application to market
MER/29. The drug was not on the market long before evidence of alarming symp
to ms began to
come to Richardson-Menel l's attention. It (the evidence) was al
most all intercepted
at various levels of the corporation and not turned over to the
FD A. De nials
and whitewashing of the drug continued until, in May 1962, its dan
ge rs had beco
In
me 80 generally evidenced that the FDA ordered it withdrawn.
that tw o y ear
first
the
In
it.
taken
had
e
pl
peo
000
,
400
mark eting period, however,
In

[Vol. 19:251
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legal remedies provide an insufficient incentive for the riskor in
these situations, society must impose further sanctions if it is to
shift the cost/benefit ratio toward prevention. The federal laws re
quiring automobile manufacturers to install seat belts, with sub
stantial economic penalties for noncompliance, is an example of
this type of sanction.
In the situations where the compensation payment is not suffi
cient to make the riskee whole, the remaining cost of the injury
must be borne by society. Society may bear this cost directly,
through charitable medical care and disability payments, for exam
ple, or it may bear it indirectly through loss of the individual's pro
ductivity or resources. This cost to society is an indirect subsidy to
the riskor.84 Ideally, the indirect subsidy will be less than the bene
fit to society of allowing the riskor to avoid paying the full costs of
the injuries for which it is responsible. For example, the actual effeet of the workers' compensation laws is to shelter e mployers from
the full cost of employee injuries.80 It is important for policymak
ers to understand that this sheltering causes the cost of these inju
ries to be spread among society as a whole,36 an unacceptable re
sult if the subsidy does not result in general benefits that offset the
cost to society of the subsidy .17
IV.

THE ANALYSIS

OF

RISK TAKING

There are a minimum of three events involved in the loss of
money due to the occurrence of a risk. The first is an injury caused
by the occurrence of a risk, the second is a claim for compensation,
and the third is the payment of the claim for compensation. In the
simplest case, all injuries will be linked to a claim for compensa
tion, and all claims will result in a full payout of the amount of the
claim.
These three basic transactions do not occur at this simple level
year alone it added $7,000 000 to Richardson-Merrell's
gross sales.
,
C. STONE, supra note 11, at 55.
34.
35.

See generally id. at 37.
See Provost & Richards, The Company Doctor's
Responsibility to the Employee,
TRIAL, July 1981, at 35.
36. S�e, e.g., Miller, Occupational Safety, TRIAL,
July 1981 at 47 ("(l]f employee is
spared having to instal l certain
equipment , that employer will save 'costs.' Many of
t hese costs, however, . . . are . . . passed
on to others .... ").
37 A8 n�ted by Miller, "(WJe have learned
recently that 80 percent of the costs of
occupational d19eases are currently borne
b y the public through Social Secur ity disability
payments, welfare, veterans' benefits,
,,
Medicare and Med"ICal"d
Id
·

·

·

'

·

·

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
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in the real world. Not all riskees will be injured. Some injuries will
not result in a claim for compensation, and few claims will result in
a 1003 payout of the requested amount. Because of this uncer
tainty, it is more appropriate to speak of the probability38 that the
risk will occur, the probability that the riskee will claim compensa
tion, and the probability that this compensation will be awarded.
Each of these events has a certain probability of happening; the
probability of each event is dependent upon the others.89 It is this
mutual dependence that prevents the use of the simple conditional
Bayesian Theorem that has previously dominated attempts to ap
ply probabilty theory to legal analysis.
Most of the previous attempts to apply quantitative methods
to legal problems have used Bayes' Theorem.'0 The underlying as
sumption of Bayes' Theorem is that the probability of an event
occurring can be determined by combining the probabilities of the
events precedent, and that the probabilities of these events are
independent.41 Some of these analyses were performed on criminal
law problems in hope of reducing the uncertainty of the criminal
law process, but this goal was not reached for two fundamental
reasons. First, in most legal situations, the probabilities of prior
events are not independent; and second, the criminal law process is
based on a presumption of innocence.'1 This presumption demands
that the probability of the accused being guilty must be set close to
zero.0 As any term approaches zero, Bayes' Theorem is no longer
38. For ex ample, the
probability of drawing an ace from a deck of cards is 1 in 13. See
generally J. FLEISS,
STATISTICAL METHODS roa RATES AND PROPORTIONS 1 (1981).
39. Id. at 2.
40. The main propo nent of the Bayesian Theorem has been Michael Finklestein. Mr.
.
F mkl
este in is a practicing
attorney whose work has been very innovative, if controversial.
See M. F INKL
ESTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS JN LAW: STUDIES IN THB APPLICATION or MATH
EMATICAL PR
OBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978), reviewed by Kaye, Naked
�tatistical Evi
dence, 89 yALE L.J. 601 (1980); Fairley, Probablistic Analyais of Identifica
t io n Evi
dence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1973); Finklestein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by
Mathematics",
84 HARV. L. REv. 1801 (1971); Finklestein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach
to Identific
ation Evidence, 83 HARV. L. RBv. 489 (1970); Kaye, Probability T_�ory Meets
Res lpsa Loq
uitur, 77 Mrcu. L. REV. 1456 (1979); Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the
Law of the L
and, 47 u. CHI. L. Rev. 34 (1979); Kaye, The Paradoz of the Gatecrash er �nd
Other Stori
es, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101 (1979); Tribe, A Further C ritiq� of Mather:iatic'!'l
_
oo/, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1810 (1971); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
e egal Pr
ocess, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
1. See J. FLEISS,
supra note 38, at 4-11.
4 2. See, e.g.
TBx. CO DE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.03 (Vernon 1979).
43. "Th e most
(or
problematic feature of Bayes' Theorem in the criminal trial context
trial) is
civil
proceed
in
liability
(or
guilt
of
y
quantifying the initial probabilit
�Y
tn
gs)-P(X).
If a pr esumption of innocence makes that variable equal zero, the formula is

:z

�
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an effective model. In order to circumvent this limitation, it is
necessary to assume that it is relatively likely that the accused did
commit the crime, an assumption that is philosophically
u nacceptable.
In order to develop an effective description of risk taking be
havior, it is useful to use a tree diagram of the events involved. Let
denote the occurrence of a risk, let
E0 denote the status quo, let
E2 denote the occurrence of a claim for compensation, let E:i denote
the occurrence of a payout, and in general let En represent the end
P( 2), P(E;i), and P(En) denote the
of the chain. Further, let
and En, respec 
probability of the correspond ing events , E1, E2,

E1

P(E1), E

E:1,

tively. Then:

P(E,)

P(E3)

P(E1)

Eo

E,

E"

Ea

Es

� � � �
)

>.)

Not

)

..;

(E1)

Not

(E1)

Not

(E.)

Not (E,)

In this diagram the probability of a risk occurring is P(E1), an d the
l
probability of the risk not occurring is 1 - P(EJ" The genera
probability of an event E occurring is
), while the general
n
probability of an event no occurring is 1 The odds•11 o_f a
• vi de d
event occurring are the probability of the event occurring di
by the probability of the event not occurri n g:

P(E
P(En).

{

1

P(Eu)
P(Eu)

-

r
The odds of an event occurring are a more useful m onitor fo
e
that event than is it.a probability of occurring because odds ar
e
more easily understood by administrative or legal per sonnel.•8 Th
N rcot·
�impl y un.wo�kable." Comment, Probability The ory and Constructive Possess ion of a
ics: On Fi nding that Winning Combination, 17 Hous. L. REV. 541, 558-59 (1979 ) .
the
is (l 44. In

.this simple model, the probability that the risk will not occur
es.
probability that the risk will occur) when the probabilities are expressed as pe rcentag
45. See J. Fuuss supra note 38 at 44
·
'
of fine
46· "Words are the Iawyer•s stock in tirade [sic?}. He w ould rather face a pag e

i.

iue

print than a simple algebraic formula." Lozowick Steiner & Miller L w an d Qua nt tat H
a
l
Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66
(1 968). See a s k
L. REv 1641,
e
KYBuRG, TuE Loo1cAL FOUNDATIONS or STATISTICAL INrERENCE 6 (19 7
4) ("[A] boOkrnbiHY
9
1
ba
had better be jolly sure that the odds he posts satisfy the axioms of the pr o
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odds of a risk occurring, a claim being filed, and compensation be
ing paid are interdependent. This is significant because it is this
interdependence that leads to feedback and pipelining.
V.

FEEDBACK AND PIPELINING

Feedback is a n electrical engineering term•' that has crept into
general usage. As used in this article, it represents the principle
that the output o f a process affects earlier steps in the process.
Feedback is positive when it stimulates the process, and it is nega
tive when it inhibits the process. In the context of this discussion
of risk management theory, feedback refers to the effect that
changes in the odds of events occurring have on the odds of other,
related events occurring. Products liability law provides a good ex
ample of feedback.
In the early development of products liability law it was very
difficult for an injured person to recover compensation from a
pro duct manuf acturer. The defense of privity4• cut off most ac
tions, and the remainder were defeated by the difficulty of showing
neg ligence in manufacture. •• This resulted in negative feedback be
cau se the payouts for lawsuits were very low. This discouraged at
tor neys from filing products liability claims, lowering the odds that
an injury would be linked
to a lawsuit. The low odds of a payout in
turn reduced the riskor's incentive to make safer products.
When the courts abolished the privity defense60 and adopted
vario us types of strict liability standards, it became easier for a
!>laintiff to win a reasonable payout. 61 These reasonable payouts
Incre ased the chance that an injured person would file a claim for
co mpens ation (increasing linkage), and provided an incentive for
calculus.").
47. For a direct analogy between electrical engineering and law, see H. ODUM, ENVI
R ONME NT,
POWER, AND SOCIETY 226 (1971) ( As systems become old and complex, special
e nergies m
ay go into conserving network features through the institution of law. Law may
be defined as
a formal statement of a switching network and its formal alternatives.").
. "The
4
8
law of products liability began with the case of Winterbottom v. Wright..
.
"

�hich has been
described

·

[Winterbottom estab
as 8 fishbone in the throat of the law..
lis hed ea rly
) the general rule that the original seller of goods waa not liable for damages
caused by
their defects to anyone except his immediate buyer or one in privity with him."
W. PROSSER, supra
note 20, at 641.
49. Id. at 642 .
50. J . SALES & J . PERDUE, Tim LAW o r STRICT TORT Lwm. JTY I N TBxAs 126 (1977).
51 . Gre enm
an v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 , 27 Cal. Rptr.
69 7 (1963).

..
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riskors t o produc e safer products. This positive feedback dramati
cally changed products liability law from an unimportant area of
practice to a m ajor area of litigation.

law,
law is

Feedbac k usually results in the gradual evolution of the
but it can c ause dramatic shifts, rapi d ly changing the way

practiced. These rap i d shifts usually follow legislative actions, such

as the enactment of the e q ual employment legislation,62 or major
judicial reinterpretations of existing laws, such as the Roe v. Wade
abortion decision. 68 In the usual course of events there is � five- to
ten-year inertial period between the development of a new

legal

theory and its adoption by the majority of the legal profession. It is
this inertia that provides the greatest risk management chal
lenge-the problem of the delayed recognition of i mportant new
risks due to the lack of litigation pressure.
The delayed acceptance of new legal theories results in

a

pe

riod when the riskor is potentially liable for the conseq uences of
the risks affec ted by the new theory, but the probability of being
sued (linkage) is very low. The riskor will use one of t hree stategies
in this situation: implement an effective risk management pro

gram, accepting that it will not be cost effective during the transi
tion period; c ontinue the status quo, saving money initially but los
ing money in the longer term; or implement a limited (sham) risk
management program that will appear effective be cause of the
probability of being sued

.

low

The implementation of sham risk managemen t programs is
the usual response to a new legal development. The most common
example of a sham program is the establishment of an incident re
p orting system without establishing a method of preventing the
identified risks. a. This can be the most financially risky choice if it
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e -17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) .
T�is problem usually arises when
incompetent or impaired medical staff mem·
r � dentlfied. The politics of medical staffing decisions
normally make it very difficult to
discipline a member of the medical staff. For the
legal consequences of this problem see
Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d
7 16 (Tex. 1971); R. BROOK, QUALITY OF
ASSESSMENT: A COMPARISON or F1VE METHODS
or PEER REVIEW (1973)" Annas Who to Call
When the Doc or is Sick, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1979 ' at 18· C�roll Di ciplining the
·
.
·
·
Errant Physicia
n·· In �·irginia,
· Investiga
tions Show an Increase ' 106 V >.. MED. J. 400
.
·
( 1979); Dunn, Hospital Corporat e Lia
" b'" l'"ty.· 'F'
1. 'he Trend Continues 8 MEDICOLEGAL NEWS'
0ct. 1980, at 16· Felch
& Halpe
·
. .
·
. rn • .Coping
· h
wit
Physician
·
Incompetence, 79 N.Y. ST. J.
MED 1921 (l979)., Fre1hc , Verification of
Physician Credentials, 80 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 1997
· . .
(
· •r
e Medical-Legal Implications of the
·
Problem of the Errant or Sick Phy·
s
C OMMENT, July-Aug.
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delays the implementation of an effective risk management pro
gram while it documents risks that are not properly managed. It is
this type of delayed action that leads to pipelining.
Pipelining is the accumulation of unrecognized liability. This
occurs when a riskor maintains the status quo approach (or a sham
program) to managing a specific risk, while the probability of a
payout due to that risk has been substantially increased. Changes
in payout can be overlooked for a certain period of time because of
the long interval between the occurrence of an injury and the pay
ment of a claim for compensation. In medical malpractice litiga
tion, for example, this delay can be five years or more. During this
period, a large number of persons can be injured before the riskor
becomes aware of the accumulating liability. A dramatic example
of pipelining occurred at the University of California at Davis
Medical School. Over a twenty-two-month period, the cardiac sur
gery and kidney transplant services experienced a dramatic rise in
morbidity and mortality. This became public when university phy
sicians stopped referring patients to the affected services. Once the
injured patients became aware of the problem, they filed
$500,000,000 in lawsuits."
Most cases of pipelining result from the short-term manage
ment goals of many managers. These short-term goals can also
cause an effective program to be abandoned. Just as inertia can
cause an ineffective risk management program to be continued
while a pipeline of injured persons accumulates, an effective risk
management program can be discontinued because of the losses
that are paid during the start-up phase of the program, but whose
cause was several years earlier. The only effective protection
against both pipelining and the abandonment of an effective pro
gram is the development of short-term monitors of risk manage
ment performance, coupled with a constant surveillance of feed
back effects.
�ANCET 1358 ( 1979 ;
) Talbott & Benson, Impaired Phy1ician1: The Dilemma of Identifica
tio n, 66 PO
STGRADUATE Mso., Dec. 1980, at 56; and Williamson, Braswell, Hom & Loh·

meyer, Priority
Setting in Quality Auurance: Reliability of Stoff Judgment in Medical
Institutions,
16 MBo. CARE 931 (1978).

55.

TIME, July 20, 1981, at 72.
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MONITORING RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Conditional Odds

It is basic to the development of an effective risk management
program that the factors that influence the odds of the occurrence
of each event be identified. For example, the odds of a lawsuit's
being filed after an injury (the "linkage" between the injury and
the filing of the lawsuit) are equal to the probability of the suit's
being filed divided by the probability of the suit's not being filed:

P(LINKAGE)
1

-

P(LINKAGE)

There are many factors that can influence the odds of

a

worker's filing a lawsuit. For example, one major factor is whether
the worker is a member of a strong union... In this situation we
would discuss the odds of a worker's filing a lawsuit, contingent
upon whether that worker is a union member. Those are the condi
tional odds: we are interested in how the condition of being 8
union member affects the odds of a worker's filing a lawsuit. This
would be expressed as the probability of a union member's filing a
lawsuit, divided by the probability of a union member's not filing
lawsuit:

8

P(LINKAGE I UNION MEMBERSHIP)
1

-

P(LINKAGE I UNION MEMBERSHIP)

The probability of a lawsuit's being filed can be conditioned
by as many factors as can be identified.17 The general form for ex
preBSing the conditional probability that an injury will be linked to
a lawsuit is:

P(LINKAGE I C1, C1, C, . . .Cn)
In this expression C1 could represent union membership, C2 could
represent the worker's age, C could represent the worker's job
classification, with additional
terms being added for each factor
that is identified. The general form for the conditional odds of a
worker's filing a lawsuit would then be:

C

56
Umon
· members are protected from arbitrary firings by the grievance process· This
.on
makes them more likely to take legal action against their employer than nonuni
employees.
w.
57. Contrast these conditional factors with Hohfeld's "operative facts. " See, e.g.,
HoHPELD, FuNDAMBNTIAL LEGAL CoNcRPTS AS APPLIED
REASONING (1978).
·

.
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P(LINKAGE I Cu C,, C,, . . . C0)
1

-

P(LINKAGE I C., C,, C,, .

. . C0)

This same type of conditional statement could be set up for
the odds of the occurrence of the risk itself," the odds of a pay
out,19 or the odds of any other event'° that could be added to the
chain.61 Using the example of products liability litigation, we
would determine that the odds of an attorney's filing a products
liability claim (the linkage of an injury to a lawsuit) is conditioned
by privity (before this was abolished) , by the standard used for
liability, and by the potential payout. Thus:

P(LINKAGE/PRIVITY, LIABILITY, PAYOUT)
1

-

P(LINKAGE/PRIVITY, LIABILITY, PAYOUT)

It is the identification and tracking of these conditional factors
that form the basis of effective risk management programs.
Changes in these conditional factors will presage changes in the
odds of the major events' being monitored, giving the riskor ad
vance warning of incipient problems. The tracking of these factors
involves standard data processing techniques such as trend analy
sis,12 but the factors themselves will differ in each different risk
environment. For example, in a hospit.al the risk manager will
monitor such factors as patient satisfaction, compliance with ther
a�y, and medication errors, while in a steel mill the risk manager
will monitor visits to the medical department, requests for safety
equipment, and sick leave. The same mathematical techniques
c�uld be used, although the data themselves would be. complete y
different. The main caveat in designing these tracking programs is
that the math
ematical techniques used do not mask the occurrence
of unusual events
that can disproportionately influence liability.

�

B.

Outliers

Outlier is the mathematical term for an unusual event that
can have a
disproportionate effect on the process being monitored
because the event
lies outside of the expected range . for the data.
An outlier may
be a catastrophic event, such as incinerating a pa58. P (RISK Cl' C2, c ,
Cn).
I
3
S9. P(PAYOUT C ' c2,
C3,
Cn).
I l
60. P<EVENT / c
,
c
c2,
,
en).
3
1
61. For a p
hilosophical discussion of the interdependence of legal events,
}{gGIU., N ATURAL LAW 60
(1975).
62. C. OSTROM,
TIME SBRIBS .ANALYSIS: RliGRBSSION 'l'BcHNJQUBS 9 (1978).
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

see

G.

268

HOUSTON LA W REVIE W

[Vol.

19:251

tient,63 or it may be an unusual trend, such as an excess of respira
tory deaths during a certain time period.64 Outliers are important
because they usually represent the type of prevented or normally
prevented risk that can lead to large financial losses. Since most
commonly used statistical techniques mask outliers by averaging
them into the bulk of the data, the data must be scanned, either
manually or electronically, to identify any outliers. This process of
identification is called flagging, from the data processing technique
of marking certain types of data with codes called flags. It is im
portant to realize that a point may be an outlier because it is out
of the range normally observed by the specific riskor, or it can be
an outlier because it is outside the range of values observed by
similar riskors. In the second case it can violate the standard of
care required, even though it is within the range usually observed
by the individual riskor. It is the identification of these "commu
nity standard" outliers that demands an effective means of sharing
risk management data among riskors. The analysis of conditional
factors and outliers is important in demonstrating the effectiveness
of new risk management strategies in situations where there is a
substantial residual liability obscuring the effectiveness of the new
program. If the manager can demonstrate favorable trends in the
conditional factors and r educe the number of outliers, he will be
able to legitimate the new program despite the "pipeline" of past
claims that must be paid. Such analysis is critical to insure that an
effective strategy will not be discarded because of the inertia of the
system being managed. The remainder of this paper will illustrate
the use of this method by analyzing the problem of acceptance of
risk in the medical environment, using the same methods that
.
would be used to analyze risk taking behavior in other situations.
VII.

MANAGING MEDICAL LEGAL RISKS

The management of the legal risks that arise in the me�i
.
s
environment involves activities that reduce the odds of the risk
paoccurring, and activities that reduce the odds of the injured

�

Dist.]
Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
1981, writ filed).
was
64. A murderer in the Ann Arbor, Michigan Veterans Administration Hospital
the
e
r
efo
able to kill eight patients with a respiratory depr
ers b
nt' and poison 40 oth
.
1 a 30-daY
hosp1·ta1 became aware of the problem, even though the events took place m on Y
63.

�

period.

NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 19.
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tient's seeking compensation after a risk has occurred . 85 This dis
cussion will focus on the second group of activities-those that re
duce the odds that an injured patient will sue the provider for
compensation. The methods that are described are applicable to
both activities, but the second group best illustrates the signifi
cance of the conditional factors.
Medical care delivery is fraught with both negligent and non
negligent risks. The success of a medical risk management strategy
will be determined by its effectiveness in pers uading injure d pa
tients to accept their injuries as an unavoidable complication of

their medical care. It is important to differentiate this
of risk from the defense of assumption of risk.

acceptance

The classic statement of the assumption of risk defense is in
Prosser's Law of Torts:
In its simplest and primary sense, assumption of risk means
that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his
chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defen
dant is to do or leave undone...
The defense of assumption of risk is in fact quite narrowly
confined and restricted by two requirements: first, that the plain
tiff must know and understand the risk that he is incurring, and
second, that his choice to incur it must be entirely free and
volu ntary. 87

The limits of this
defense are sufficiently great that is is seldom
possible to pers
uade a jury that a medical malpractice plainti ff
sh ould not win a
recovery because the plaintiff assumed the risk of
65. For an overview of medical risk management, see LAMBERT, MoDERN MEDICAL MIS
.
AK
ES
( 1978) ; Benesch, Risk Management in Pennsylvania Hospitals: Panacea or Poison?,
T
47 INs. CouNs.
J. (1980) ; Bryant & Korsak, Who is the Risk Manager and What Does He
Do?, 52 Hosp.,
Jan. 1 6, 197 8, at 42; Groves & Korsak, Draft Job Description Provides Model
o
is
anag
er Position, 52 HOSP. , June 16, 1978, at 70; Hirsch Risk Management - The
f rR kM
Physician 's
Role, 7 LEGAL AsPBcrs or Mao. Puc. 49 (1979); Korsak, Risk Management
Ac ti i ies
Boost Effec tive ness of Self-/Murance Program, 52 Hosp., Feb. 16, 1978, at 5�;
v t
�ucera & Ator, R
isk Management, 32 J. HoSP. MGMT., Oct. 1978, at 26; Schwegel, Physi
ci ans Join
in Efforts to Reduce Risks 8 HosP. MED. STAFF, Nov. 1979, at 2; Stearns & Fox,
Assessing Qu
ality Assurance and Risk Management Activities: A Profile An alysis, 5 QUALI
TY REv. BULL , Oct. 1979, at 26; Stewart, Risk Management: No Task for the Timid, 34
.
,

Tausn1:, Apr.
197 9, at 10.
66. W. Paossu, supra note 20, at «O.
67. Id. at 447 .
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the injury. 88

The most important limitation of the assumption of risk de
fense in the medical environment is that it has not been accepted
as a defense to negligent injuries. The courts systematically refuse
to accept "blanket consent" forms that could conceivably cover
any act of negligence, and no health care provider has used a con
sent form that specifically includes a litany of negligent risks.
While there is no theoretical reason why a patient could not con
sent to (and thus assume) the risk of the surgeon's leaving a clamp
inside the patient, the authors believe that a court, if faced with
this situation, would rule that this type of consent would be
against public policy. 89

Prosser's formulation for assumption of risk requires both
prior knowledge and prior consent. 70 Acceptance of risk does not
depend on this type of explicit agreement, but arises from the en
tire context of the health care provider/patient relationship, both
before and after injury. While this unstructured relationship pro
vides a greater opportunity for mitigation of the damages, it also
increases the chance that a pipeline may be created by a major
shift in the public perception of the provider's competence. A med

�

ical risk manager therefore must identify and monitor those fac ors
that condition the patient's acceptance of the risks of medical
treatment.71 There are three main sources of information on those
factors: the first is a retrospective evaluation of the treatment his
tory72 of patients that have sued the facility in the past; the second
is an analysis of reported malpractice cases and plaintiff's law liter
ature to determine which factors condition the patient's attorney's
decision to file a lawsuit;73 and the third is a patient-attitude sur68.
69.

Id.

70.

Id.

Id. at 444.

��;

at 447 .

For a discussion of the use o f artificial intelligence techniques to analyze roe
.
decisions, see Duda & Gasching, Knowledge Based Expert Systems Come of Age, 6 B

�1 .

238 (Sept. 1981) .
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vey to determine what factors the patients of the facility consider
important. 7'
Once the risk manager has used these sources to develop a list
of the relevant conditioning factors, a monitoring system must be
developed to track those factors. 711 This monitoring system must
meet three criteria: (1) It must flag outlier events rather than ob
scure them. This means that all unusual events must be promptly
brought to the attention of someone with the authority to inter
vene if it is necessary. A prompt intervention can both mitigate the
damages (persuading a patient not to leave the hospital, for exam
ple) and reduce the chance of being sued by improving patient sat
isfaction. (2) It must produce meaningful trend analyses rather
than frequency reports. These analyses must not only provide in
formation about the number of incidents, but must also provide
information on whether there is a deviation from the expected
number or type of incidents. For example, a ten-percent increase
in deaths is not as useful as a report showing that the increase
occurred on one day on one Boor. (3) It mtist not create new risks
that increase the facility's liability. The most common type of new
risk is the documentation of incompetent staff members without
disciplining them. Meeting these criteria requires the design of a
reporting system to collect the necessary data. This reporting sys
tem will draw on traditional sources of risk management data such
as incident reports, but it also must draw upon other data sources
such as nursing committee reports, tissue committee reports, and
the reports of any other oversight committees the facility has in
.
place.7•
The compilation of this multisource data demands that stan
dard forms he
developed to faciliate the transfer of information
from the com
mittees to a central data base. This data base can be
as simple as a set
of cross-referenced index cards, but in all but the
smallest facili
ties it will require the use of a computer to file elec-

74.

Thia is actually classic market research, with health care aa the product. The main
with this type of research is that the patients are often afraid to criticize the health
care provide
r, making the Hpertise of the survey team especially important. See Ware, Ef
fec ts of
Mao. CARE
Acquiescent Response Set on Patient Satisfaction Ratings;
problem

0978).
7�.
Brannig
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For a discussion of the potential legal risks in computerizing medical data, see
.
.
Medical Com
an & Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective
pu ter Progr
ama, 7 AM. J. LAW & MBD., Summer 1981, at 123.
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tronically the data and perform the necessary analyses.77 The de
velopment of an effective computer data base management system
requires careful attention to the potential legal consequences of
uncontrolled access to the data. Once data is put in a machine
retrievable form,7s it is as readily available to potential litigants as
it is to the facility's risk manager. This can be especially harmful if
the data demonstrates the presence of prevented or normally pre
vented risks that the risk manager is unable to manage success
fully. While this does not mean that secrecy is always the best pol
icy (it is usually the worst policy when a patient requests his or her
own records79), it is important that the risk manager be able to
control the extent and timing of access to the general data base.
This control requires both physical and legal safeguards.
The physical protection of data is straightforward. The com
puter should be of a limited-access type, preferably a dedicated
machine, and there should be no other users on the system when
the risk data base is on the system. If the facility does not have a
dedicated computer for risk management, then it should make pro
visions for storing the risk management data outside of the com
puter when the data is not in use. The implementation of legal
safeguards is not so straightforward.
The recent decision in Upjohn Co. u. United States" set forth
general guidelines for establishing the attorney work-product priv�
lege against court ordered discovery . While the details of the deci
sion are beyond the scope of this article,81 three important points
must be considered when designing a risk management data base:
( 1) both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product rule
is
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are not absolute protections, but may be defeated in certain cir
cumstances;82 (2) information that is collected in anticipation of
litigation may be protected, even if it is not collected under the
direct supervision of an attorney;88 and (3) previously unprotected
information may not be sheltered by giving it to an attorney.84 A
facility that i s planning a risk management program must decide
to what extent it needs to protect its data from discovery before it
begins data collection. If it decides that it needs the maximum pro
tection from discovery that is available, then it must incorporate
an attorney into the risk management scheme. This can be an
outside counsel who supervises the data collection and also per
forms the necessary computer analysis of the raw data, or it may
be an in-house counsel, if the in-house counsel is truly an indepen
dent counsel. If it can be shown that this in-house counsel actually
acts in an administrative capacity, then the work-product doctrine
may not be applicable.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The rapidly escalating cost of litigation has made it imperative
that corporations develop alternatives to the traditional legal
mechanisms for dispute resolution. Risk management programs are
an effective means of avoiding disputes and can be very cost effec
tive if properly designed. While it is simple to design a program
that will deal with obvious, costly risks, the optimal development
of a program to deal with risks whose cost of occurrence nearly
equals their cost of management requires sophisticated analysis
techniques. The application of these techniques demands that a
uniform method of data handling be developed and that the sys
tematic identification and monitoring of conditional factors be car
ried out. The authors have tried to present an analytical frame
�ork to allow risk managers in diverse environments to share
�nformation and contribute to a general model of risk management
Interventions.
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